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BB39/S88/ CONFIDENTIAL COPY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S.S. ARIZONA   Pearl Harbor, T.H., January 28, 1942.   From:  The Commanding Officer. To  : The Chief of Naval Operations.   Subject: Information on Damage Control.   Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Ltr. No. 2CL-42 of January 6, 1942.      1.       Information regarding the conditions during and after the air attacks of December 7, 1941 required by lettered paragraphs of reference (a) is submitted as follows: (a), (b) and (c)           (1) The only Information available concerning the material condition set at the time of attack is taken from the statements of the few survivors that were aboard during the raid. Exploratory work has to date, been limited to the main and second decks aft and does not include the more vital parts of the ship. Some conclusions can be drawn from the known habits and practices of the crew.           (2) All "X" doors and fittings with few exceptions were closed at this early hour (0755) on a Sunday morning. Many "Y" doors and fittings were also still closed from the previous night. Many of the engineering spaces, those not actually in use, were in condition "Z" and locked. This included the shaft alleys, engine rooms, firerooms but not the dynamos, evaporators and ice machines. (d)           (1)This attack was so sudden that little time was allowed for setting condition Zed before the forward magazines exploded and completely demolished the whole ship forward of frame 88.           (2) From statements of survivors it is believed that material condition Zed was nearly set in turrets 3 and 4, but not completely set. There were no survivors from turrets 1 and 2, but there is no reason to believe that they were not also in condition Zed or very nearly so.          (3) There is good reason to believe that the boiler division and "B" part of the ship below the 3rd deck was probably in condition Zed shortly after the attack began and probably before the one bomb was observed going down the stack.          (4) From experience in setting condition Zed, statements of the survivors, and exploratory work so far, it is fairly certain that condition Zed was not completely set on the 3rd deck and probably most of the 3rd deck armored hatches were still open. This can be further amplified as salvage work progresses. The total destruction of the forward part of the ship will make it difficult to get positive information concerning this part of the ship.

BB39/S88/ CONFIDENTIAL COPY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S.S. ARIZONA   Subj:      Information on Damage Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (e)           (1) Shortly after the attack began, probably 15 minutes, the forward magazines exploded and all further efforts to close up the ship were fruitless. (f)           (1) Complete destruction with no survivors from many portions of the ship make it difficult to determine the effectiveness of the watertight compartmentation. The ship settled for several days and escaping air was observed in many areas which might indicate that some spaces were slow in flooding. Statements of the survivors would however, indicate that the flooding was general after the magazine explosion. Water filled turret 4 at a very rapid rate and this would not have been the case if Zed were completely set. Some doors aft could have been ruptured by a bomb which hit turret 4 on the side plate but there is no positive evidence as yet. (g)       No information available. (h)           (1) Many fires were started by the bomb hits and the whole forward part of the ship was ablaze after the magazine explosion. The decks burned readily and lots of floating oil increased the fire. (i)           (1) The wind carried the smoke forward in a black cloud obscuring everything forward. Fumes and yellow smoke issued for some time from bomb holes. (j), (k), (l) and (m)           (l) An early bomb hit down the stack disrupted the fire main and bilge pumps and there was no water with which to fight the fires. ((There was no bomb hit down the stack - rather, the explosion in the forward magazine caused a surge of pressure inside the ship that vented out of the stack, appearing to be an explosion withing the stack itself) C02 was used on the quarter deck to stem small fires but the general conflagration forward was completely out of hand. There was no opportunity to observe the effectiveness of the fire fighting equipment. (n)           (l) The early destruction of the engineering spaces took all power, light and telephone service from the ship. (o)           (1) Flashlights were used effectively in the turrets but the supply was not adequate to meet the emergency. - 2 -

BB39/S88/ CONFIDENTIAL COPY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S.S. ARIZONA   Subj:      Information on Damage Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (p)           (1) Many men were bacly burned, even to death, by the blast from the magazine. Flash proof clothes might have minimized these losses.   A. J. Homann Copies to:  Ch.of Bureau of Ships,  CinCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet)  Combatfor (Commander, Battle Force)  Combatships (Commander, Battleships)   - 3 -

SOURCE:
National Archives & Records Administration, College Park
Record Group 19, War Damage Reports & Related Records, 1942-49

Transcribed by RESEARCHER @ LARGE. Formatting & Comments Copyright R@L.

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