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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L U.S.S. Helena  
Damage Report  


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

     No. 1:   Lieutenant C. O. COOK, U.S.N., Senior Assistant Engineer Officer.
(Charles Olney Cook Jr. later commanded DD-822 USS Robert McCard and lived until August, 2001)

          I had just completed breakfast and was still sitting at the table in the wardroom when word of the attack was passed, over the loudspeaker system. I heard the explosion of bombs in the distance through the airports.

          I proceeded to third deck and back toward engines aft and arrived in the scullery at the top of the forward hatch to No. 2 engine room when the torpedo hit. The concussion there did not seem strong, but the jump the ship took caused me to fall down the trunk to ths upper platform of the engine room. The lights were all out, and since the auxiliary machinery in the forward engine room had been in use for at anchor services, including the generator there, I decided to go toward forward engine room to see what had happened. At the top of the trunk I was told by some men that I could not get through to the forward engine room on the third deck, that the route was blocked by smoke and probably fire.

          I proceeded to next compartment aft, B-316-L, in order to take the ladder to second deck, and there saw a group of B and M division men just coming up out of their quarters. I directed a Chief Petty Officer of each division to take charge of his own men and man boilers aft and engines aft, respectively, to get the boilers lighted off aft and to warm up main engines 2 and 3. Incidentally, the lights were restored at the time I entered B-316-L, which was probably about a minute or minute and a half after the torpedo hit.

          I then proceeded to second deck and forward to Repair III, still trying to find out whether we had a forward engine room and whether or not No. 3 boiler, which had been in use for auxiliary purposes, was still steaming.

          Arriving at Repair III, I found some of ths men there all ready on station, with both 2JZ (Damage and stability control) and 3JV (Engineer's circuit [boiler]) phonss manned. The door leading forward on starboard side, by crew's lounge, was closed, and I was told there was a fire on the other side. Some one was all ready running out a hose from the plug on No. 6 riser by post office. I went to the door with one of the men and cracked it cautiously to investigate. Then, not seeing bright flamas, I opened it wide to get a good look. B-203-3L,


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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into which the door opened, was full of heavy, suffocating smoke, which burned the eyes and made it hard to pass through, but there was no visible sign of fire. The lights were still out here. The hatch to B-306-L, the compartment below, where canteen and issuing room were located, was still open. In B-306-L, too, the lights were out, and from here the heavy smoke issued, and the silence was complete. One man was lying unconscious across the top of the hatch combing. We dragged him into the crew's lounge and shut the door.

          It was then discovered that there was no pressure on the firemain. Piecing this together with ominous lack of noises which ordinarily indicate that machinery is running in the forward engine room, I surmised that space had been out of commission. A report then came from boilers aft that there was no steam pressure for operation of the blowers there while lighting off. I directed that they light off with natural draft. The heavy smoke in the compartment forward made me believe we had a fire in engines forward or possibly boilers forward (since no steam was coming aft from that station) and I notified central, also giving them the word that there was no pressure on the firemain and would not be until we got some more boilers lighted off.

          I was worried about the fire, since, if the quantity of smoke was any criterion, it was a big one, there was no pressure on the firemain, and the equipment in the repair locker was, under these circumstances, hardly sufficient. It seemed that the only thing to do for the moment was to close off the threatened area and isolate it. I tried to get some idea from Repair I as to how far forward evidences of the fire extended but without much success. I equipped a couple of men with rescue breathers to explore and took frequent looks through the door.

          Word soon came up from boilers aft that there were no sprayer plates there (Sprayer plates are used to atomized the fuel oil - without them the boilers could not operate). These were stowed in the ice machines, and I started a man forward to get them.

          Meanwhile word came from the bridge via central asking when we could get underway. I reported back that I could not say when, since we had no steam and did not know how soon we would have it.

          Word came from boilers aft that the sprayer plates had at last arrived and that No. 6 boiler had been lighted off. I later learned that Ensign Westphal and CWT Westbrook had wrapped wet towels around their faces and delivered them through the smoke to boilers aft.


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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          A while later CWT Westbrook appeared and notified me that engines forward was flooded to the overhead, that the same was true of No. 2 fireroom, that boiler operating station No. 1 was flooding slowly, and that No. 3 boiler had been secured and all personnel had left safely, He and Ensign Westphal closed the door of the forward engine room access trunks, while carrying the sprayer plates aft. I sent this word to Central via 2JZ (Damage and stability control) phones. The smoke in ths compartments forward of Repair III was subsiding, and the hospital corpsmen at Repair III with some other men pulled those still alive out of B-306-L.

          Shortly after lighting off, boilers aft reported they had a fire there. Knowing that they had plenty of C02 with which to fight it, I told them to put it out, which they did, and not too long afterward came the successive words that the fire was out, steam had formed in the boiler and a blower had been started.

          Chief Machinist Smith, who had gong to engines aft, took charge of warming up. With 25 pounds on the boiler he ordered it cut in on the auxiliary steam line, and immediately started No. 2 fire and flushing pump, giving us firemain pressure at last. A quick check at the second deck plug on No. 3 riser (by wardroom pantry) indicated the firemain had been cut, so a jumper was run from No. 6 to No. 3 riser on the second deck and pressure was restored to forward section of the firemain. The necessary cut-outs in the main were closed at the second deck, controls to keep pressure from being lost through the broken section.

          Another query having been received from central as to when we would be ready to get underway, I sent back word that the after main engines would be available for use in about a half hour, (No. 5 boiler having been lighted off) and repeated the information on flooded spaces. I sent CMM Barman to the topside to amplify the report on conditions below to both the Captain and the Executive Officer.

          Main engines aft were finally warmed up ard rolled over, boilers 7 and 8 finally lighted off and the engineering department reported ready for getting underway direct to bridge by 1JV (Maneuvering and docking circuit ) phone from engines aft.

          During this period six dead were removed from B-306-L. Oil had come up in that compartment to a height of about a foot on ths starboard side. The ship had a slight list to starboard. I checked the other compartments on the third deck in this vicinity to see the extent of the damage.


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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          The Chief Engineer came aboard at some time during this period and directed me to stay in the Repair III araa while he went aft.

          I have only a hazy idea of the time at which the various events occurred and in some cases am not sure of their sequence. Ths first time I looked at a clock was 1300. It seemed that hardly an hour had passed since the torpedoing occurred.


   C. O. COOK; Jr:,
Lieutenant,. U.S. Navy,
Asst. Engineer Officer.


   No. 2: Ensign MILLER, U.S.N.
Mason Miller Jr. later achieved at least the rank of Lt Cdr. and served on USS Houston CL-81 and USS Nassau CVE-16. He survived the war and lived until December 2008.

          I awakened about 0730 on the morning of December 7, dressed, and walked into the wardroom in preparation for breakfast. As I sat down, over the announcing system came the word, "Japanese planes are attacking Ford Island, All hands to General Quarters." Immediately I ran up to the main deck intent on proceeding aft to my general quarters station. Just as I reached the main deck I was jarred by a tremendous explosion which seemed to lift the ship bodily several feet and apparently came from amidships between the OGLALA moored alongside and the HELENA just forward of no. 3 mount. At this time I saw at least seven torpedo planes which had apparently just passed over the HELENA dropping torpedos aimed at the row of battleships moored across from us. All had big red discs on their wings, and my estimate of their altitude when they dropped their torpedos was from 50 to 75 feet above the water.

          I made my way down to compartment B-306-L where apparently there was need of a firefighting party. The compartment was filled with smoke and there was soot on all the bulkheads but I found no fire. The ship's store was a complete wreck, and the bulkheads around seemed to be buckled. Several men had just completed dogging down the hatch leading to the forward engine room. There were at least six bodies lying on the deck apparently dead. I immediately checked the firemain to see if there was any pressure and found none. I climbed up the hatch to Repair III and encountered Lieutenant Cook who told me to get a firefighting party to fight the fire. With the assistance of several men and two men whom Ensign Thompson sent over on ths dock, we connected the hose up to the fresh water supply on the dock. Again I went down to B-306-L with


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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the fire hose to see if any fire had broken out. None had, and this fact I reported. However, the water was turned on, and it was several minutes before I could get it shut off. This action succeeded in putting about an inch of water on the material in the ship's store.

          With the assistance of several men in the engine relief party we checked the water level in the escape hatch of No. 1 engine room. It was full. We reported this to Repair III. Upon checking the level in the forward boiler room we found the water just starting to rise in the trunk. This fact was reported to Repair III. We then completely closed all the entrances and exits to B-306-L and returned to compartment B-316-L, our general quarters station.

         Around nine o'clock the word came down from Repair III that water was leaking into the after diesel room. I went aft with a party from engines relief to C-301-L where I met Chief Machinist Jones coming down from Repair III with a submersible pump. We rigged this up and attempted to take a suction on the diesel room when we received word that this flooding was under control.

  No. 3:  Chief Machinist David L. JONES, U.S.N.
No history has been found for Jones at this time. He is not listed in eithe rthe survivors or lost from Helena's sinking.

          At the time general quarters sounded I was eating breakfast. First word received was, "All hands to general quarters." followed by, "This is not a drill. We are being attacked." I went aft and when I got as far as the marines' compartment, we were hit by the torpedo. I was nearly knocked off my feet but was uninjured. All lights went out and I started to go down to the forward Diesel engine room. When half way down No. 1 Diesel engine started up ond the lights came on. I then went up and tried to get aft through the smoke to my station but was unable to get farther than the machine shop. Several men were closing the auxiliary steam stops at this time. I helped several men who were badly burned and knocked unconscious from both compartments bordering the forward fireroom.

          After these men were removed and the boiler stops were closed I closed off ths watertight doors and then went up on the main deck. At this time the OGLALA was partly capsized and a tug boat was making fast to tow the vessel away. I helped cast off lines and then went across deck and down to Repair III station. Lieutenant Cook sent me below to check up on damage and see if all main and auxiliary steam stops were closed. I then went forward and down to the machine shop


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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compartment and opened up the watertight door to No. 1 boiler control and went down below. About two feet of water was above the floor plates in this compartment and numerous streams of water were leaking from around the top of boiler compartments 3 and 4. I then went up and secured the watertight doors and checked on all steam valves and found them closed. I then went back to Repair III and reported that the forward boiler control and boiler rooms were flooding rapidly.

          I then went down aft and forward to check on the forward engine room. Smoke had cleared just enough to get to the forward engine room. I found all watertight doors closed. There were eight men in the compartment above the forward engine room. Six of them I ascertained were dead, the other two I had removed aft out of the smoke. Oil was leaking in fast in this compartment and I went back to Repair III and reported same to Lieut. Cook. At this time word was received from Repair I that there was no water pressure on the firemain forward. Lieut. Cook and I then ran a firemain jumper from aft to forward and got pressure on the forward part of ths ship, We then rigged up to pump out the compartment above the engine room.

          Lieut. Cook took charge below and I took several men to the top side and broke out the portable gasoline driven pump. We abandoned this undertaking shortly afterwards when it was ascertained that no more oil was leaking into this compartment. Word was received from the after engine room that there was no water in the after surge tank and for us to run a hose from the dock to the after surge tank vent. I went up to the main deck aft and rigged up a fresh water line to the vent and filled the surge tank. Later I went below and found the ice machine compartment was flooded up to the level of the watertight door sills. I rigged up a portable electric pump and cleared this compartment of water and found that the water was backing up through the deck drains. When those drains were closed, no more water was found to enter. (Note) Later in the afternoon Lieut. Cook and I removed ths dead from below.




C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L U.S.S. Helena  
Damage Report  


Subject:   Personal accounts of B division personnel of events of December 7, 1941.

  No. 1: Ensign N. E. WESTPHAL, U.S.N.R., B Division Officer. (Westphal later became a naval aviator and served aboard the cruiser Canberra)

          I heard General Quarters sound and the Officer of the Deck announced that, "Japanese planes attacking Ford Island." Very shortly thereafter I heard a loud, dull explosion which felt to be directly underneath my room. I was thrown to the deck by the force of this explosion and immediately the lights went out. Seconds later our emergency lights came on and I was able to get partly dressed and proceeded directly to my General Quarters station. Upon arriving there I was affronted bv a man who was afire running along the passageway by the machine shop. This man rushed past me and I followed him to the compartment just forward of the passageway. There I directed several by-standers to wrap the man in a blanket and take him to the sick bay. (I think this man was J. L. Smith, GEM. Joseph Smith CEM(AA) is listed as transferred to the Navy Hospital, Pearl Harbor, but is not listed among the casualties of Pearl Harbor)

          I then proceeded to Boilers Forward going over to the starboard side where I met Westbrook, CWT, just coming up the starboard trunk. He informed me that he had given orders to secure fires under No. 3 boiler (auxiliary boiler) and that the boiler room was flooding. I proceeded down to Boilers Forward, to investigate and discovered water pouring out of the burner fronts in No. 3 boiler.

          Westbrook, GWT, then returned to Boilers Forward and together we checked the securing of the firoroom. We stayed in Boilers Forward until water rose over the floor plates. In the meantime I sent for submersible pumps, however, these never did arrive. Finally we abandoned boilers forward and closed the hatch and watertight door on the starboard side, the port side being already closed.

          I then met Chief Machinist Smith by the ice machines and told him that boilers forward was flooding and that it was impossible to proceed to engines aft on the third deck. About this tims some man with a rescue breather apparatus showed up, so I sent him aft toward the log room to investigate for fire. He returned shortly and said that there was no evidence of fire but considerable wreckage was sighted just aft of the log room. I then tried to get word to Central Station via a talker in the compartment just forward of the machine shop, who had contact with Repair I. I don't know if word ever got through at that time, however. I then ordered Westbrook, CWT, to proceed to boilers aft via the port passageway to take charge of lighting off. He returned shortly and

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Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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informed me that tha smoke was very thick and stifling. I then went to the ice machines and grabbed a handful of burner plugs and sprayer plates and then Westbrook and I wrapped wet towels around our faces and proceeded to Boilers Aft. Upon entering compartment B-306-L I observed about 6 to 8 men lying on the deck near the barber shop, one or two were groaning but the others appeared dead. All were burned black and were not recognizable. I went over to the forward trunk of the forward engine room and saw that the battle hatch was sprung and could not be closed, so I started to dog the watertight door. About this time the smoke lifted considerably and I noticed some firemen standing behind me. I gave them orders to finish dogging the watertight door and went over to the starboard side of B-306-L to check the other watertight door. This one was closed and dogged securely. I also noticed several other dead men on this side and that the canteen was a total wreck.

          I then proceeded to Boilers Aft via the port side. Upon arriving I gave orders to light off boilers 5 or 6 and gave Hamm, CWT, the few burners and tips that I had brought along. We tried to light off No. 5 and 6 together, but a fire developed on the deck of No. 5 boiler and we had to use C02 extinguishers to put it out. No. 6 boiler finally got up enough steam pressure (about l00#) to run No. 6 blower, and No. 3 fire and bilge pump. Suction was immediataly taken on No. 3 fireroom and soon the water level caused by the leak near the flange of no. 1 shaft was under control. Shortly after that No. 6 boiler was cut in on the auxiliary line, and a few minutes later No. 5 boiler was also cut in on the auxiliary line. No. 7 and 8 boilers were being closed up by Traver, Baker and Gintowt (Edwin A. Traver, CB (PA) USN and Edward F. Gintowt, Bmkr2c, USN were lost with the ship when she was sunk in the Battle of Kula Gulf on July 6th, 1942). Subsequently these boilers were lighted off and cut in on the main and auxiliary steam lines. I sent Westbrook back up to secure more sprayer plates and plugs and also to take Larson who was burned and was lying on the floor plates very much in the way to the sickbay (Raymond D. Larson, WTlc, USN was transferred to the Naval Hospital at Pearl Harbor. He later returned to the ship and survived her loss at the Battle of Kula Gulf). Later I sent Pezonella, F3c, up to check on the sprayer plates and he met Larson at the top of the trunk returning with a bucketful of sprayer plates and plugs.

          During this time I manned the 3JV (Engineer's circuit [boiler]) phones and kept Engines Aft informed as to what progress we were making. Finally the order came to secure all but one boiler. No. 8 was then chosen for auxiliary boiler. I remained in Boilers Aft until 1600 when the word was passed to set condition Baker.


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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  No. 2:  BALDWIN, R.W., WT2c, U.S.N.
Raymond R. Baldwin, WT2c, USN was lost with the ship during the Battle of Kula Gulf

          The 04 to 08 watch, was relieved for chow at 0730 by Baldwin, WT2c, Farmer, F2c, and Garney, F2c. Farmer was firing the boiler and Garney was tending the checks.

          It was about 07555 when I was getting ready to take the 8 o' clock readings, that the general alarm sounded. Word was then passed, "All hands to General quarters. Japanese planes are attacking Ford Island. Break out all service ammunition."

          There was then an interval of about 30 seconds, and then I heard a large blast which shook the whole ship. The lights went out immediately. Garney, on the checks, yelled down to me that he could not find the emergency hand lantern, which is located in the back of the single water glass of the steaming boiler. He also said that he had struck a match to check the water level and found it all right. I went up on the grates and got the lantern in back of the glass on no. 4 boiler. I rushed over to the water glass on no. 3 boiler to check the water level myself. I found same at steaming level. I also found the hand lantern, which was off the hook and on the ledge in front of the boiler. The lantern was turned on, and I instructed Garney to watch the water carefully. I then went down on the floor plates and opened the throttle on #1 Fuel Oil Service pump. I took a quick look at the auxiliary steam gauge, which registered 400# of steam pressure, and shouted to Farmer to standby to light off and bring the steam pressure back up. At that time there was considerable confusion down there as the superheater temperature alarm was shorted, and the horn was making a loud noise. The guns were firing quite rapidly and it was almost impossible to make oneself heard. After starting the standby pump and telling Farmer to light off, I went back to check up and see how much the fuel oil pressure was. The gauge on the pump registered nothing. I then told Farmer to open the suction valve on B-941-F and I proceeded to open B-942-F, which were the standby fuel oil tanks. At that time Westbrook, CWT, entered the control room. I rushed back to the service pump, and there was still no discharge pressure. Farmer then called over and said that there was water coming into the control room from the burner opening on #1 burner. Westbrook went over to look at it and told me to start securing the fireroom.

          I went over and started to secure #4 F.D. blower. Garney then yelled down that the water level was dropping fast. I told him to secure everything up on the grates. I then

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Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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secured #1 F.O. fuel oil service pump. Westbrook told Farmer to secure the auxiliary steam stop. He stepped in the air locker and came right out again and explained that he could not get Back there as #2 fire room was half full of water. I told him to go up and close it from the 3rd deck. We finished securing the fireroom, and Westbrook said that we would log it, that we secured, at 0800. Shanabarger, WT2c, and Ensign Westphal came down just as we were finishing securing. Mr. Westphal wanted to know where the water was coming from and I told him that it was impossible to get back in #2 fireroom to find out, as it was flooded.

          All hands then abandoned the station. Westbrook then asked if the auxiliary steam stop was closed tight and Fanner reported to him that it was. Westbrook also asked about the feed stops and checks. Garney said the checks were secured with a wrench, but that he did not know whether or not the stops were secured. I then proceeded to go down the ladder with Garney right behind me. I paused at the bottom of the ladder and told Garney to make fast work of it as ths boiler was liable to blow up any minute. I then openad the door into the control room. I looked at the steam gauge which registered 125# of steam pressure. There was water coming out of all four burner openings on ths superheated side. We closed the feed stops and returned up the ladder. The hatch at the top of the ladder was then dogged down. The time then was about 0803.


  No. 3:  WESTBROOK, J.M., CWT, U.S.N.

          I had been to the sickbay and was returning aft on the port side and had reached compartment B-306 when the general alarm was sounded. My general quarters station is in the forward boiler group and I was near the port hatch when there was a heavy explosion to starboard. This area became filled with smoke immediately. Lights were out. There were three men in the control station, Baldwin, WT2c, Farmer, F2c, and Carney, F2c. They were trying to start No. 1 F.O. fuel oil service pump. The electric port F.O. service pump had stopped. I immediately closed oil valves (two) to the furnace and started to investigate No. 2 fireroom. There was considerable pressure on door leading to this area and I saw to it that the door was secured because of the possibility of live steam. On closing the other door one of the men said, "Look, there is water coming through burners 1, 3 and 4." I ordered those men to secure everything and to secure auxiliary steam stop, top side. I secured the blower and the oil pump and went to the upper grates. Men there had secured checks. Men below were finishing closing feed stops. Time at this period was about 0800.

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Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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Shanabarger, WT2c, arrived about this time.

          We left by starboard hatch, closing both battle hatches on the way out. Mr. Westphal and Chief Machinist Smith were at the ice machines. We then reported fireroom secured and flooding. We returned, opened hatches and found water was spouting from top of burner which was about five feet above floor plates in control station. On second inspection water was in the air looker. Hatches were then secured.

          Mr. Westphal ordered me aft to light off boilers aft. On reaching B-306, heat and smoke were stifling. I saw several men lying on deck, apparently dead. I went back and reported to Mr. Westphal. We secured towels and returned down port side going to after boiler operating station. Larson, WT1c, burned about the hands and face, was at this station. About this time word came that sprayer plates were needed. I returned forward, Larson going with me on his way to forward dressing station. On reaching B-306-L, a hospital corpsman there administered first aid to Larson. Larson continued with me to Ice Machines. We secured sprayer plates and returned aft to port hatch. Larson went into boilers aft, turned sprayer plates over at fireroom hatch and assisted in securing same. My station being flooded, I went to Repair III and assisted hospital corpsman in removing dead from B-306.

  No. 4:  HAMM, G.S., CWT, U.S.N.

          When general quarters sounded, I was in my bunk. When the ship was hit, I was in compt. C203-2L. I went to compt. C301L and had to wait there until I got a gas mask before going forward. I started forward on port side and came to the hatch leading down to No. 2 B.O.S Boiler Operating Station. I knew that it would be necessary to light off aft because of the location of the hit. I went to No. 2 B.O.S., and Mr. Westphal told me to take charge of No. 5 and 6 boilers and get thsm lit off. I lit a fire under no. 6 boiler and left Bonyea, Flc, to watch it. I went back of 5 and 6 boilers and closed all bulkhead stops leading forward. I cut no. 6 into auxiliary steam line so that I could start a blower as soon as steam was formed. I got 50# pressure on #6 and started no. 5 blower to stop smoke. I put no. 3 fire and bilge pump on no. 3 fireroom to control flooding there. I raised steam on 5 and 6 boilers and had them cut into main line. About 15 minutes later I got orders to secure the main stops.

          As soon as no. 7 and 8 boilers were closed up, they were lit off and raised steam. As soon as no. 7 and 8 were on

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Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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the line, I secured no. 5 and 6. I controlled flooding of No. 3 flreroom with. no. 3 fire and bilge pump. Hennon, CWT, took charge of no. 4 fireroom, and I boosted steam on no. 5 and 6 boilers until about 2000. At that time the Engineer Officer said not to boost steam until 0400. I remained on watch until 2400 Sunday night. In carrying out the various duties of closing steps, cutting in boilers, etc., I had assistance from Yates, WTlc, Hungerford, WT2c, Bonyea, Flc, and Burke, Flc.

  No. 5:  TRAVER, E.A., CWT, U.S.N.

          I was in the C.P.O. quarters on or about 0800 when the general alarm sounded. I started to my general quarters station at Boiler Emergency. I could not get through the mess hall compartment on account of smoke and no lights. I went up to the second deck to Repair III and could not get through that way.

        I was then sent to Boilers Aft to get those boilers lighted off. The furnace doors were off 7 and 8 boilers. Baker, Bmkr2c, and I closed up those boilers and got them ready to light off. I stayed in the fireroom until about 1500 and reported to the repair group in the after mess hall.







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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L U.S.S. Helena  
Damage Report  


Subject:   Personal accounts of M Division personnel of events of December 7, 1941.
No. 1:   Chief Machinist W. M. SMITH, U.S.N., M Division Officer.

          At about 0758 General Quarters sounded and it appeared that less than a few minutes later a heavy explosion occurred aft throwing me off my feet. After regaining my feet I continued making my way to my battle station in Engines Aft. Upon coming abreast of Boilers Forward starboard escape trunk, 3rd deck, I was informed by Westbrook, CWT, that he had died out fires under no. 3 boiler, and no steam was available and that water was flooding into boiler operating station from boiler room no. 2 (B-3) being beyond control. I ordered Westbrook to abandon the forward boilers and secure all watertight fittings. About this time a man from Repair I (believed) fitted with rescue breathing apparatus reported on his findings aft of the ice machines passage was that smoke from that area prevented him from seeing any damage and he believed no fire or gas was present but recommended that the section be isolated from that point which was accomplished on third deck by various available personnel.

          I continued to second deck to attempt to go aft. Smoke in same area as third deck caused me to through clipping room to top side and to after section of the ship. Making my way to area of main stops S16 snd S19 where I located all engineering personnel unable to get forward to their battle stations. I ordered a steaming watch to boilers aft to light fires under no. 5 and 6 boilers and I ordered the boilermaker with sufficient help to do this. They commenced closing the firesides of no. 7 and 8 boilers. Stationing myself and M division personnel in Engines Aft I established communications on the 3JV {Engineer's circuit [boiler]) phones with Repair III and Boilers Aft and with the Bridge and Central on tha 1JV (Maneuvering and docking circuit ). During tho above period electric power had come on from No. 4 Diesel generator.

          I gave Boilers Aft orders to open auxiliary and main steam stops wide, open bottom blows, light off and blow excess water overboard as pressure increased. We would control action of steam as it came up. At about 0815 watch had commenced attempting to light cold boilers, succeeding in getting a fire under No. 6 boiler. At 0830 a fire was started under No. 5 boiler. At 0900 lighted fires under No. 7 and 8 boilers. Due to insufficient air for burning oil, difficulty was experienced in maintaining fires under boilers. Upon getting 50 PSI steam I caused the fire and flushing pump to be started as well as a forced draft blower. No. 2 dynamo plant (being electric pump


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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control) was put in service upon getting power earlier .

          At 1000 main engines no. 2 and 3 were tried out. The Engineer Officer had arrived in the engine room some time between 0900 and 1000 (not sure of time). Trying out of engines were under directions and orders of Engineer Officer. At 1200 died out fires under no. 6 and 8 boilers. At 1205 secured main stop 5-6-7-8 boiler and bulkhead stops. Engines Aft shifted to cruising machinery (pumps, etc.) between 1300 and 1430. Also shifted to no. 7 boiler for auxiliary purposes for safety's sake as at this time water from flooded no. 1 engine room was entering at a rapid rate around no. 1 shaft.

  No. 2:  KOKX, J.J., CMN, U.S.N., CMM in charge of Forward Engine Room.

          I was sleeping in my bunk when I heard the general alarm ringing and the word passed about Japanese planes attacking Ford island. Then I heard the explosion rocking the ship. I donned my clothes and headed for my General Quarters station in the Forward Engine Room. In compartment B-316-L quick-closing hatches were already closed. I opened hatch on the starboard side and black smoke came out. Repair III sent a man equipped with rescue breathing apparatus. He went into the compartment, returned and said he could not go far because he could not see. Lieutenant Cook was in charge of the party. All forward engine room personnel were told to go to the after engine room and get steam up as well as set condition Afirm.

          I checked gages and valves to see if there was any steam. I called after boilers on 3JV (Engineer's circuit [boiler]) and told them to light off boilers. I could not get any communications with engines forward. Bridge complained about making too much smoke interfering with the gunners seeing their targets, over the 1JV (Maneuvering and docking circuit ). Chief Machinist Smith took over the watch. There were no burners in after boilers and they had to sent to the ice machines to get some.

          As soon as steam reached 60# PSI started fire and flushing pump and put on firemain. Started auxiliary plant and soon as steam was up put #3 generator on the line. The generator kept tripping out. Checked steam end and found to be o.k. Started cruising feed booster and cruising feed pump. Put #4 fire and bilge pump on after diesel. After diesel reported shaft alley flooded. After boiler room put #3 F&B Fire & Bilge on their bilges to pump out water. Called engines aft and asked to


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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put #4 F&B Fire & Bilge pump on their bilges as water was gaining on them. After diessl bilges were dry so put pump on after fire room and brought water level down. Chief Engineer came down to engines aft and had steam on main plant ready to test out. Tested out main engines and kept in standby. About 1130 secured main engines. Men were scattered throughout engine room and were told to sit down. Every man was equipped with a gas mask and some men had protective clothing. Gas masks were drawn out of gas mask stowage about 0900.








Damage Report  


Subject:   Personal accounts of E Division personnel of events of December 7, 1941.

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  No. 1:  Chief Electrician (now Ensign) A. W. KERSHNER, U.S.N., E Division Officer.

          At or about 0737 the general alarm sounded. Word was passed clearly and distinctly, and in a tone that would instill action, "Planes with rising sun attacking Ford Island. Man your General Quarters station. This is not a drill. Break out service ammunition. Japanese planes directly overhead." While this word was being passed, I left the W.O. mess room, picked up my jacket and flashlight in my room and ran aft. The last of the above sentences was heard while I was in compartment A-318-L. The explosion occurred at the time I was leaving compartment A-320-L and entering compartment B-302-L at which time compartment 3-306-L appeared to be enveloped in a flash. I was knocked backwards from my feet into compartment B-320-L .

          Generator #2 had been in operation supplying light and power. Generator no. 1 was standby. Upon regaining my feet I went immediately to distribution #1. The generator was turning over; the switchboard operator was building up the voltage. The bus tie circuit-breakers were checked open and the generator was cut in on the distribution board. Generator #4 was ordered to start, circuit switches to forward twin mounts and turrets were closed, circuit breaker of bus tie was closed to distribution #4, the operator of which was ordercsd to energize his board from distribution #1; however, generator #4 was in operation with voltage built up. The operator elected to cut in #4 generator on his own board and supply distribution #3. The after AA mount circuit switches were ordered closed at distribution 3 and 4. This was acknowledged.

          Generator #l was operating erratically the first ten minutes, the frequency varying from 57 to 6l cycles. The load of distribution was transferred to generator #4. The cause of the erratic operation was investigated, the fuses of the governor control motor circuit were removed, the governor was operated manually and generator #l was cut in supplying distribution #1. The cause of the above was due to the shortcircuiting of the remote governor control circuit at distribution #2. The generator voltmeters, ammeters and kilowatt meters were out due to their circuits being interconnected with meters on distribution #2. Generator #4 was compelled to secure on about three occassions between 0830 and 0930 due to overheating of the diesel engine or water on the rheostat of the voltage regulator. Each time the load of distributions #3 and


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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4 was transferred to generator #l.

          At about 0915 water first a appeared to be dropping from the overhead on to the busses of the distribution board. Shortly after it was discovered coming out of the cables which terminated in or passed through the forward engine room. The cables were either disconnected from the board, cut at some location where the water could be drained into buckets or sheet-rubber used to drain the water away from the 440 volt busses. Cables to the automatic telephone exchange leaked water which caused it to be inoperative. Cables of supply leads from the I.C. board leaked water compromising the back of the interior communication board. Water through ship control interior communication cable caused a salt deposit on the terminal blocks of the action cutout switchboard in Central Station.

          At about 1015 permission was granted me by the engineer officer to leave distribution #1 to organize a repairs party to restore power to the vent motors forward. Temporary feeders were installed supplying vent panels #29, 33, and 51.

  NO. 2:  CUELLAR, M.W., EMlc - I.C. watch at CENTRAL, DIST. 1, I.G. ROOM at time of explosion.

          I had the I.C. watch at Central where I had just returned to after being relieved for breakfast. Arrived in Central and took the 0800 readings for power and light distribuution #l that distribution #2 had just requested. Finished giving the readings to Distribution #2 when after a short interval, General Quarters was sounded. I started to clear some loose gear from the top of the Damage Control table when Cruise, G.V., EMlc, came into Central and started to help also.

          About this time we felt and heard a big explosion somewhere aft. Lights went out immediately. I turned on a hand lantern and stayed on station until Barrett, W.K., EMlc, arrived. I then left Central and manned the X4J Degaussing control circuit  telephones in Plot, my General Quarters station. When part of the personnel got to Plot, we set Condition Afirm.


          At about 0750 on December 7, 1941, J.L. Smith, CEM, checked me off the muster list in the Electrical Workshop. I then came down below to the I.C. Room and started reading a magazine. A few minutes later, the general alarm was sounded and the word was passed, "All hands to battle stations."


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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          I came into Central and began to help Cuellar clean up the Damage Control desk. While doing that I heard and felt a violent explosion, and the lights went out. I found a hand lantern and went into the I.C. Room, snd J.L. Cattanach was manning the X4J phones. I took the light into the Diesel room so the machinist mate could find the air valves to start the diesel. After the generator was rolling over, I want into the Plotting room and manned my general quarters station.


          We had just finished muster in the shop when the word was passed over the general announcing system, "Japanese planes attacking Ford Island. All hands to General quarters. Break out service ammunition.

           I left the shop and started for Distribution one. I had just reached the top of the trunk leading down when there was an explosion that shook the whole ship and put out all of the lights. When I reached the bottom of the ladder, someone came from Central Station with a battle lantern and helped me see the way. The Diesel was started and the generator put on the line. Power was restored to boards 1, 3 and 4.


          I was in passageway outside electrical shop when General Quarters sounded. I left for distribution #4 and got as far as trunk to after diesel when I felt a blast and all lights went out. I got down to distribution 4 and manned the X4J phones and had orders to start #4 generator and supply distribution 3 and 4. Distribution #l was having trouble with their generator and lost the load so I closed the bus tie between distributions 4 and 1. Shortly after distribution 1 came back on supplying their own board. About this time the temperature meter on distribution #4 showed 150°. I reported this to distribution 1 and got orders to secure #4 generator and to check it. I tripped out #4 generator circuit breaker and closed bus tie between #4 and 1 giving the full load to distribution 1. At this time they were starting up #3 generator and getting it ready to supply #3 and 4 distribution boards.

          I checked #4 generator and found thnt it was cool both inside and out. I reported this to distribution 1. I received orders that #4 generator would be standby. At this


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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time I noticed water leaking behind the board, and after checking found that it was coming through the D.C. bus tie between distributions 2 and 4. The water was hitting the contacts and resistors for the voltage regulator. Reported this to distribution I. Was asked if we could still run. After another check, we found out we could by controlling the voltage manually.

          At this time #3 generator was put on the line in parallel with #1 generator but kept having trouble and losing the load. Shortly after this the A.C. bus tie between distributions 1 and 4 shorted out so #1 generator was supplying its own board and #3 generator was supplying distributions 3 and 4 with #4 generator standby for #3 generator. No. 4 generator was started several times after this as #3 generator kept losing the load.


          I was at the electrical workshop when the general alarm was sounded and the word was passed for all hands to general quarters.

          I left the shop and started aft on the third deck, port side, to get to my general quarters station in the after engine room. I was just entering compartment B-316L when we were hit and ths lights went out. Mess tables and benches were knocked over, and everyone in that compartment was greatly confused, not knowing where the hit had been received nor how severe it was. Matches were struck to enable us to get our bearings again.

          I made my way to the trunk leading down to the after part of the after engine room and got a hold of the battle lantern which is located at the bottom of the ladder. Making my way to the distribution board, I found that Whitley, EM3c, had a flashlight and was manning the X4J headsets. He had communication with Central Station, Plotting Room, Distribution I, Distribution 4, Gyro Aft and Steering Aft. Word was received that the forward engine room and forward fireroom were flooded. Generator #1 was started up to get power to the forward part of ths ship while #4 generator was started to supply power to its own board and distribution 3. Half of the battle lighting in the after engine room and after fireroom was out due to #2 distribution board being out of commission, and we had no emergency source of supply either. No ventilation was


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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started up until we had word from the bridge, Repair III, and from Mr. Smith in the after engine room that no trace of gas had been discovered. Ary, CEM, came down tc give us a hand at the board.

          Men were sent out from the engine room to get gas masks for the men on watch there. As soon as the after fire room was lit off and steam was gotten in the engine room, #3 generator was started and put on the line and on #3 board alone. The steam pressure was very irregular all morning. Therefore, the load was shifted to #4 generator whenever #3 generator was not able to hold the load. I tested out the communications on the 2JV and 3JV telephone circuits and cut out the stations forward which could not be called in the action cutout boxes in engines aft. The general announcing system, damage control speakers and the ship's service telephones were out of commission in the engine room. Engines aft was able to communicate with the bridge and central station over the 1JV telephones. Engines aft was also able to communicate with boilers aft and Repair III over the 3JV telephones.

          Orders were given us by word of mouth and over the headsets from Mr. Buerkle and Mr. Smith who were in the after engine room, from Mr. Kershner who was at Distribution I and from Central Station.

          A close watch was maintained for any trouble at the distribution board and for any excessive amount of water which may have been getting into the bilges. Switches and the A.G. bus tie leading to Distribution II were cut out to keep from establishing short circuits at Distribution III due to the forward engine room being flooded. No electrical fires were experienced at Distribution III, and power was kept on to the best of our ability.


          At the time General Quarters sounded I was near the laundry. I immediately started heading for Steering Aft, my General Quarters station, through the port passage. The explosion occurred as I neared No. 1. Diesel exhaust. All lights went out. There was such a rush for the sickbay that no one could do more than move with the crowd.

          For fifteen minutes after the explosion I guided men to the sickbay and helped others to close the doors to prevent smoke and gas fumes from entering the compartment. I reached


Subject:   Personal accounts of various non-division officers of Engineer's Force of events of December 7, 1941.

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Steering Aft via the top side, I remained there until water from Distribution 2 seeped down causing Steering Aft to be disabled. Permission was given me to secure then.

  No. 8: KOWALIK, G.3., SMlc - A.A. M0UNT 3.

          After having mustered on station about five minutes to eight, I left the shop for the top side aft. Upon reaching the top side, near turret 4, someone ran past me yelling, "They're bombing Ford Island." Glancing at the Naval Air Station, I saw one of the hangars burning. I immediately proceeded to my general quarters station at mount 3. When reaching the mount, I found the door to the gun pit secured as certain persons already were at their station.

          While I was trying to open the door, I saw the water rise over the height of one of our stacks. This occurred just about on our starboard quarterdeck. At the time I thought it was a bomb. Later I reached the upper handling room and helped to handle ammunition. Due to the power being lost, we tried manual operation which proved too slow. A few minutes later power was restored.

  No. 9:  MISKUF, A.J., EM2c, BARNES, D.R., F3c - AFTER GYRO ROOM.

          At approximately 0755 the E division hod finished mustering in the electric shop. Almost simultaneously general quarters was sounded. We left ths shop and headed aft towards the After Gyro. When we reached the mess hall, compartment C-301-L, there was a violent explosion. After arriving in the After Gyro Barnes manned the X4J while Kiskuf donned the X2JD. Miskuf could not get any communication and proceeded to shift to the X2JE which circuit was intact. Central Station gave orders to start the gyro which was done immediately upon the restoration of power to the auxiliary I.C. switchboard.


Section B:   Description of Engineer's action after torpedo hit.

          The following is a transcription of the Engineering Log for December 7, 1941:

0000 to 0800

          Moored port side to "Ten Ten" dock, Berth 2, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. No. 3 boiler steaming for auxiliary purposes, steam pressure 550 psi with 2 burners in use, size 4215 sprayer plates. Auxiliary machinery in use: In Engines Forward: No. 1 dynamo condensing plant, no. 1 cruising feed pump, no. 1 cruising condensate pump, no. 1 fire and flushing pump, no. 2 generator. In Boilers Forward: No. 4 forced draft blower, no. 1 port use fuel oil service pump. Other auxiliary machinery in operation : #1 ice machine. Machinery in standby status: #l generator, #1 emergency feed pump. Fuel oil suction from B-933 and 934-F; standby tanks B-930, 929-F. Make-up feed from B-944-F, standby B-945-F. At 0758 word received over General Announcing System, "Japanese planes bombing Ford Island. Man all battle stations; break out service ammunition." At 0759 ship was struck by a torpedo at frame 74, starboard, in the forward engine room. Lost steam pressure and electric light and power. At 0759-30 #1 generator started but acted erratically. (Cause later determined to be the grounding in the Forward engine room of the remote governor control from Distribution 2.) The forward engine room and #2 boiler room flooded rapidly; #1 Boiler Control Room flooded through bulkhead leaks and burner barrel holes. The Boiler Rooms were secured by the operating personnel; no casualties in these spaces.

0800 - 1200

          Moored as before. After Boiler Room personnel made preparations for and took steps to light off the after boilers. At 0801 Distribution 1 closed circuit breakers to #1 Distribution Board giving light and power to forward part of ship, including #1 and 2 5" A.A. mounts. 0801 #4 generator started and brought up to voltage. At 0802 #4 generator circuit breaker to #4 Distribution Board closed giving light and power to after section of ship, including #3 and 4 5" A.A. mounts. 0803 #4 Distribution Board Bus-tie breaker to #3 Distribution Board closed giving power supply to that board. 0810 opened #l generator circuit breaker to #l Distribution Board, and closed both bus-ties between #l and 4 distribution boards, putting entire load of #l, 3, 4 boards on #4 generator. Corrected erratic performance of #1 generator by removing governor control motor circuit fuses, and operated governor by hand control. After restarting #1 generator, found conditions normal. 0815 parallelled #1 generator with #4 and opened bus-tie between #1 and


Section B:  Description of Engineer's action after torpedo hit.
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4 generators, thus splitting the load as follows: #1 generator carrying its own board, #4 generator carrying distribution boards 3 and 4.

          Lighted off #6 boiler between 0810 and 0823 but forced to secure due to fire on furnace floor from excess oil: fire extinguished, and steps again taken to relight. Lighted off with natural draft. Boiler-maker crew working to close up #7 and 8 boilers which were under overhaul on firesides. All bulkhead 82 cut-outs were secured to prevent leaks into damaged spaces. Leak from bulkhead gland of #1 shaft severe, about 1000 - 2000 gallons per hour; water level rising under #5 and 6 boilers. About 0830 succeeded in lighting off #6 boiler; opened wide all auxiliary steam line stops including boiler stop. About 0835 #5 boiler was lighted off. Boilers were forced but were finally restrained by Bridge because of excessive smoke obscuring A.A. gun crew's sighting of enemy planes. At 0900 #7 and 8 boilers closed and lighted off. By 0930 steam had formed in #5 and 6 boilers; #5 forced draft blower was started when steam pressure attained 50 PSI. Number 3 and 4 Fire and Bilge pumps were started and out in on main drain pumping from #3 boiler room bilge to sea. No. 2 Fire and Flushing pump was started, supplying pressure to the Fire Main (Repair III had, meanwhile, run a firemain jumper from #3 to #6 riser to supply firemain forward.) Started #2 dynamo condensing plant and shifted auxiliary exhaust to this plant. At 1000 main and auxiliary steam lines were warmed up to 500 psi with #5 and 6 boilers: all engine room auxiliaries were being run preparatory to getting underway.

          Meanwhile, at 0830, the #4 generator temperature indicator showed 150°F so this generator was secured and number 1 given ship's load. Investigation showed the difficulty to be a defective indicator, the generator windings feeling cool to the touch. At 0840 #4 generator again started, paralleled with #1 and again given its load of Boards 3 and 4. At 0900 water rose in the port shaft alley, adjacent to #4 generator compartment. The bilge level of the generator compartment also rose; #4 generator again secured until bilges cleared of water by #4 Fire and Bilge pump. At 0920 #4 again started.

          At 1000 #3 generator was started and paralleled with #4. Considerable difficulty was experienced with this generator losing its load. After about an hour's work, checking every detail, #3 finally held the load. All generators (#1,3,4) were placed on their own boards.


Section B:  Description of Engineer's action after torpedo hit.
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          About 1015 rolled #2 and 3 engines about 6 times in each direction; conditions appeared normal. Reported to Bridge "Ready to get underway on after engines but recommend not doing so." About 1030 #7 and 8 boilers were cut in on main and auxiliary steam lines.

          An excessive amount of feed water was being used during the foregoing warming up. Suction was taken successive from B-955-W, 954-W, 945-W and 944-W. When the latter tank was cut in, salinity rose and oil appeared in the boiler gauge glass of #5 boiler. (It was later discovered that water and oil from the Forward engine room polluted this tank.)

          The Engineer Officer personally reported to the Captain about 1020 that feed water was running low, that only about 5000 gallons remained in the after surge tank, and about 2-3000 in the after feed bottoms. As the forward engineering spaces were flooded, the feed bottoms there could not be used; the evaporators could not be used because auxiliary steam and auxiliary exhaust lines carried away when torpedo exploded on the starboard side. Electric power for evaporator pumps was off due to the severance of their supply from #2 distribution board. As no supply of boiler feed water existed, ship would be restricted to about 10 knots for a running period of, perhaps, five hours. Water, in the meanwhile, was taken from the dock to keep surge tank and feed bottoms B-954 and 955-W filled. This water later tested at 5 grains salinity.

          Number one Fire room started flooding about 1000 as evidenced by the draft gauge in the after engine room.

          Permission was received about 1140 to secure from making preparations for getting underway. Closed main steam stops on 5-6-7-8 boilers and died out fires under boilers 6 and 8.

          About 1000 salt water started to drip slowly from the terminals of the D.C. bus-tie feeder from Distribution 2 on to the voltage regulator rheostat of #l generator on Distribution Board #1. From this time on salt water appeared at terminals of all cables that either terminated at #2 Distribution Board or were parted in the damaged area. In many cases the cable had to be cut to prevent leakage to the back of tha distribution boards; these cables could not be disconnected on the back of the board without de-energising the board. (All distribution boards had to remain energized at all costs to furnish power to the A.A. mounts.) In several cases the water dripping on the distribution board bus-ties caused flash-overs.


Section B:  Description of Engineer's action after torpedo hit.
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At 1040 water from D.C. bus-tie at Distribution 4 was dripping so badly on the voltage regulator rheostat that the generator had to be secured until cable was cut and rheostat dried out. #3 generator carried Board #4 in addition to its own during this period. At 1100 #4 generator again placed on its own board.

          Steps were instituted to cut or disconnect all accessible leads from the damaged area that leaked. Before this task could be accomplished several fires occurred which were quickly extinguished. The Ship's Service telephone system which was in partial operation grounded out from leaking cables. The steering gear became inoperative when the cable which supplied power from #2 Distribution Board grounded out in the Control Panel in Steering Room causing the entire steering system to be disabled. Fire Control, Ship's Control, and other cables leaked at connection boxes or cut-out boxes, but, in general, were cut-out or disconnected before damage occurred.

1200 - 2400

          Moored as before. At 1215 secured auxiliary steam stops of #6 and 8 boilers. At 1315 lighted off fires under boiler #7; at 1400 died out fires under #6 boiler. Kept #3 Fire and Bilge Pump suction on bilges of #3 Boiler room. During the period of 1200 - 1400 the port shaft alley was cleared of water. (Cause of filling of compartment still unknown.) During the afternoon, careful inspections of bulkhead 82 were made; bulkhead found to be wrinkled in spots due, perhaps, to violent blow delivered it by the explosion with the accompanying displacement of #1 shaft in its bulkhead gland. The shaft coupling adjacent to the bulkhead was spread 2½-3", the tapered pins pulling through the flange of its adjoining section. Shored #82 bulkhead against the Boiler Control Room bulkhead and against the lower framing of Boilers 5 and 6.

          The Electrical Division started task of placing jumpers from "live" power panels to those served formerly by #2 distribution board to provide essential services, ventilation, lighting, refrigeration equipment.

          The ship was darkened at sunset and Condition Two watches established. During the night, between 2000 and 2100, a fuel barge came alongside to receive fuel preparatory to Helena's going into drydock. Fuel was shifted from forward and aft from tanks thought to be intact to the fuel barge; the port side of the fuel transfer line proved to be intact through the damaged spaces. The After Fuel Oil Transfer and Booster pumps were used to transfer fuel oil.


National Archives & Records Administration, San Bruno (San Francisco) Branch
Record Group 181, Mare Island Naval Ship Yard General Correspondence Files, 1941-47

Transcribed by RESEARCHER @ LARGE. Formatting & Comments Copyright R@L.

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