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CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  

September 5, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL:

From: Commanding Officer.
To  : The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
 
Subject: War Damage Report.
Reference: (a)  Buships Confidential Letter C-EF13/A9(374) C-S81-3, C-EN28/A2-11 of October 28, 1941.
(b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-42.
 
Enclosures:  (A) Photographs of diagrams and damaged areas.(Not included in the records)

   1.       On Monday, August 24, 1942, the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE was attacked by Japanese dive bombers at about 1712, zone minus ll½ time. The ship had been at General Quarters and in Condition AFIRM since 1335. The ENTERPRISE suffered three (3) direct bomb hits, and there were a number of near misses, one of which was very close under the stern and several close enough to cause shrapnel hits in the side and superstructure.

  2.       Submitted herewith is a report of damage and measures taken to control damage. Paragraphs are lettered and numbered in accordance with the form set forth in reference (a).

       A.  GENERAL.

           1 & 2.  The U.S.S. ENTERPRISE was attacked by Japanese dive bombers at about 1712 on August 24, 1942. Zone description: Minus 11½.

           3.  The ship was 185 miles east of Tulagi in Latitude 08 - 38' (S), Longitude 163 - 30' (E) in approximately 3,000 fathoms of water.

           4.  The ship was coming to course 170 (T), speed 26 knots. When the attack commenced at 1712, the ship was maneuvered radically. At 1726 steadied on course 090 (T). Speed was reduced to 20 knots at 1752.

           5.  The draft before damage was 24' forward, 27'-8" aft; after damage 23'-7" forward, 28'-2" aft.

           6.  From 1600 - 1800 there was a slight southeast swell.

 

-1-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    A.  GENERAL (Continued)

             7. From 1600 - 1800 the sky was alnost cloudless with a few low and high clouds; ceiling unliuited; visibility 30 miles; surface winds moderate east southeasterly, 14 knots; flying conditions excellent.

         B.  DIRECT BOMB HITS

             (a) Direct Hit by Bomb (1st Hit) at 1714.

                 1.  Direct hit by bomb, estimated weight 1,000 pounds, 12" diameter, delayed action, possibly an armor piercing bomb.

                 2.  The bomb was released by a dive bomber; estimated altitude 1500 feet; angle of release 65 to 70.

                 3.  The bomb hit the forward starboard corner of number 3 elevator, flight deck, at frame 174, 22 feet to starboard of the centerline.

                 4.  The path followed by the bomb was through starboard bulkhead of elevator well, through the inboard forward corner of Group III gun gallery, through hatchway at 01 level, through hangar deck at frame 172, through deck of D-203-1LM to point of detonation between 2nd and 3rd decks in D-303-1L at frame 171, 12 feet from starboard side.

                 5.  Thickness of plating penetrated by bomb:

  Flight deck: 1/4"
Side bulkhead of elevator well (bulkhead of gun gallery): 1/4".
Deck of gun gallery: 1/4".
Forward bulkhead of hatchway leading to gun gallery: 1/4".
Hangar deck: 3/4".
Deck of D-203-1DI: 1/4".

                 6.  Distance fron point of first impact to point of detonation was 42 feet.

 

-2-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HITS

                 7.  Detonation was of high order. There were a large number of small fragments of 1" size found in the damaged area. Although there were some fragment holes which must have been caused by fragments as large as 3 or 4".

                 8.  (a) The impact produced a small hole in the flight deck, and started a fire in inboard forward corner of Group III - 5" gun gallery. Jagged holes were made in each surface penetrated by the bomb, but there was no indication that the bomb tumbled.

                     (b) The blast effect was very extensive in D-203-1LM, D-203-2L, D-303-1L and D-419-A. Twenty four foot craters were blown in the 2nd and 3rd decks at about frame 171 above and below the point of detonation. The deck of D-419-A had a hole approximately 12 feet long and from 2 to 4 feet wide. The side plating was pierced just above and below the water line in D-419-A and D-521-A, largest hole being about 6 feet long and 2 feet wide. The 2nd deck was bulged up distances varying from 4 to 12 inches over its entire width between frames 157 and 173. The 2nd and 3rd decks were badly distorted over their entire width in addition to the large holes between frames 157 and 173. The main deck (hangar deck) was symmetrically bulged between frames 157 end 173 and between the port and starboard boat pockets, the highest point of bulge being about 16 inches at franc 165. The athwartship bulkheads at frames 157 and 173 were only slightly distorted except for the starboard side between 2nd and 3rd decks (frame 173) which has a large hole and several smaller ones and was badly distorted. The starboard bulkhead of D-523-E was caved in and holed between 2nd and 3rd decks, and bulged in between 3rd and 4th decks. W.T. doors 2-173-1, 3-157-1, 3-173-1, and 3-186-2 were blown open and wrecked. No hatches were blown open. Nearly all bunks, lockers, and appurtenances in compartments D-203-1LM and D-303-1L, and a large nunber in D-305-L, were wrecked. Crew's washroom and water closet D-203-2L was conpletely wrecked as well as the Carpenter Shop adjacent to port. The brig was demolished. Numerous longitudinals, frames, and vertical stiffeneis in the damaged area were severed or cracked.
                     The holes in side plating of D-419-A and D-521-A resulted in flooding of D-521-A and partial flooding of the starboard section only of D-419-A, up to just below the arched doorway of the N.T. bulkhead. The small hole in the forward bulkhead of D-419-A permitted about a foot of water to enter the starboard side of D-417-A. The list resulting fron this hit was approximately 3 (S). About 55 tons of dry provisions, value about $7300.00, were ruined.

 

-3-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (Continued)

            8.   (c) Fragments traveled downward from the point of detonation between deck and overhead of D-303-1L through decks of D-303-1L and D-419-A, through outboard side of D-521-A, forward through bulkhead 157 on 3rd deck and made one hole through bulkhead of D-417-A at frane 165, and aft through bulkhead 173 on 2nd and 3rd decks. Splinters traveled sideward through side plating of D-303-1L, D-419-A, and one splinter through blanked off airport in D-305-L; inward through starboard bulkhead of D-523-E, and upward through deck of D-203-1LM and main deck.
                     Thickness of plating penetrated by splinters and distance from point of detonation:

Deck of D-303-1L - 1/4" plate, distance 10'.
Deck of D-419-A - 1/4" plate, distance 12 to 16'.
Bottom of D-521-A - 5/8" plate, distance 16'.
Bulkhead 157, 3rd deck - 3/8" plate, distance 56'.
Side plating D-303-1L (S) - 3/8" plate, distance 20'.
Side plating D-419-A - 5/8" plate, distance 12'.
Side plating of D-305-L through blanked off airport -
   3/8" plate, distance 21'.
Bulkhead of D-523-E (S) at 3rd deck level - 1/4" plate,
   distance 16 to 22'.
Forward bulkhead of D-419-A - 3/8" plate, distance 23'.
Deck of D-203-1LM - 1/4" plate plus CRS deck of 1/8",
   distance 8 to 40'.
Main deck - 3/4" plate, distance 23'.

                 (d) There were no indications that the bomb was of the incendiary type, but fires resulting fron the explosion and hot fragments were started us follows:
                       (1) Small fire in Group III - 5" gun gallery where bomb passed through. Some protective clothing and gas masks were ignited and were smoldering.
                       (2) Fires were started in D-203-1LM, D-303-1L, and D-305-L, and consisted mainly of burning and smoldering bedding and personal effects from lockers. These fires created dense smoke which completely permeated the compartments mentioned above. The small amount of paint which had not been removed prior to the action burned in just a very few small isolated areas, and in some places was somewhat scorched.

                 (e) Damaged systems were as follows:
                       (1) Fire main system ruptured in D-523-E, D-303-1L, D-203-1LM, and on hangar deck at frame 173. These ruptures were all in the after riser of the starboard fire main. The fire

 

-4-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (Continued)

            8.   (c) (1) main was segregated prior to action at frame 111 (P) and (S), thus creating 4 sections, the forward and after sections port and starboard, each section being supplied by a pump.

                     (2) The damage control systen was ruptured in D-305-L and D-419-A, and carried away in D-303-1L, D-203-1LM. The riser to the starboard side of the hangar deck water curtain for Bay Number 4, frame 173, was ruptured eight feet above the main deck level.

                     (3) Ventilation systems in the damaged areas were either demolished or put out of commission from lesser damage.

                     (4) Numerous lighting cables were cut in the damaged areas.

                     (5) Communications with Central Station were unimpaired except for those loud speakers and ship service phones in the damaged compartments.

                 (f) Damaged machinery:

                     (1) Number 3 elevator out of commission. The low pressure and high pressure accumulator tanks were forced away from starboard bulkhead in D-523-E, motors were submerged in oil and salt water, and the oil storage tank was crushed and the bottom blown out. This spread oil on the 3rd deck which rendered footing very treacherous.

                     (2) Ammunition hoist motor number 8 in Compartment D-203-1LM was knocked from its mounting.

                     (3) Ventilation blowers 2-158-1, 2-158-2, 2-170, 2-176-1, and 4-173-4 were wrecked.

                     (4) Three Frigidaires and the dishwashing machine in D-303-1L were wrecked

                     (5) The machines in the carpenter shop were damaged beyond use.

                     (6) The ammunition hoists in D-303-1L and D-203-1LI1 were bent and put out of commission.

                 (g) A large portion of the personnel casualties occurred among the members of the ammunition parties in D-203-1LM.

            9.  A yellowish smoke resulted from the bbomb explosion, but the gas mask offered good protection against it.

 

-5-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (Continued)

             10.  Fires were fought by using water, foam generators, and C02. The dense smoke resulting from the fires, the wreckage of lockers and bunks in the damaged compartments, and the damage to the firemain hindered the repair party personnel in fighting the fires. The smoke was very hard to clear out of the compartments. Ventilation (Supply) was started in the undamaged area forward on the 2nd and 3rd decks, and doors were opened on these decks and hatches opened on hangar deck to clear the smoke and to reach the fire with the fire hoses. Portable ventilation blowers were used also. Gas masks were very valuable for short periods to personnel entering the smoke filled compartments. All fires were under control in approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the first hit, although later small fires of smoldering bedding started but were extinguished in a short time. Firemain valves 5-160-3 and 5-125-5 were closed to segregate the damaged section, but since the damaged firemain was in the riser at frame 160, valve 5-125-5 was opened later. The water from the ruptured firemain helped put out the hottest fire which was in D-303-1L near the point of detonation. Damage control valve 7-129 was closed to prevent flooding due to damage but was later opened, and valve 6-143-5 was closed when it was found that the damage was in the starboard side riser.
                  The holes in D-419-A and D-521-A were plugged by constructing a cofferdam of 2 x 6 planking placed vertically, placing wire mesh screens over the holes, and then packing mattresses, blankets, pillows, etc,, down between the screens and planking and tightening up by wedging the planking outboard against the mattress packing. All doors and hatches in the area had been closed and there was no seepage, as the voids and storerooms adjacent to the holed area were found dry. Door 5-165-1 did not leak and D-520-A was dry, Tho outboard bulkhead of D-520-A and. the outboard bulkhead of D-523-E between the 3rd and 4th deck level were shored. Approximately 245 tons of water were taken aboard in D-419-A and D-521-A. The list was removed as follows:

Pumped sea water overboard from:
B-15-F - 11,400 gallons to 500 gallons.
B-21-F - 11,700 gallons to 700 gallons.
B-27-F - 11,600 gallons to 800 gallons.
Flooded with sea water:
B-16-F - 10,000 gallons.
B-22-F - 10,000 gallons.
B-28-F - 10,000 gallons.

 

-6-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (Continued)

List removed was approximately 3. After the cofferdam was in place, the two flooded compartments were pumped dry, using submersible air driven pumps first until the danger of explosive fumes had passed and then using electrically driven portable submersible pumps. After the compartments were pumped down, one pump was sufficient to take care of the seepage through the cofferdam.

             (b) Direct hit by bomb (2nd hit) at 1714.5.

                 1.  Direct hit by bomb, estimated weight 500 pounds, demolition type, estimated diameter 12", short delay fuze.

                 2.  The bomb was released by dive bomber, estimated altitude of release 1500 feet, angle of dive 65º - 70º.

                 3.  The point of impact was at frame 179 flight deck, 11 feet from starboard edge of flight deck.

                 4.  The bomb penetrated the flight deck and detonated about three feet above the deck of the Group III gun gallery.

                 5.  Bomb penetrated:

                      Flight deck, 1/4" plate, 3" wood.
Bomb may have pierced top of ammunition hoist, as powder in the hoist exploded also. Hoist plating: top cover 3/8" plate with 1" web; side plates 1/2".

                 6.  Distance from point of impact to point of detonation was about eight (8) feet.

                 7.  Detonation was of high order. Only fragments found were small, about 1" in diameter, although some fragment holes were fairly large.

 

-7-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (2nd hit continued)

             8.  (a) The impact produced a jagged hole in flight deck about 12 inches in diameter.

                 (b) The blast effect of the bomb alone cannot be determined due to the fact that there occurred a secondary explosion of approximately 40 rounds of 5"/38 caliber ready powder near point of detonation of the bomb. The effects of the combined explosion were as follows: Hole blown in starboard bulkhead of number 3 elevator well approximately 12 feet long and 6 feet high; deck of gun gallery blown in over an area 18' feet by 8 feet. The instruments on guns numbers 5 and 7 were wrecked. The ammunition hoist for gun number 7 was torn away and pushed inboard. The flight deck over the gun gallery was bulged upward two feet between frames 173 and 186. Number 2 arresting gear deck sheave was forced loose by bulging up of flight deck at frame 173 (S), and the yielding element control cable was cut. Splinter shields around the 5" guns were torn loose from moorings and badly deflected. Ready powder locker for gun number 5 was blown inward and disintegrated; the one for gun number 7 was damaged but the powder in it did not burn. Hatch and scuttle 02-174-1 were blown in and wrecked; upper half of door 1-174-1 was blown off and twisted out of shape.

                 (c) Splinters traveled downward through deck of gun gallery, through D-103-A, through the deck of D-103-E (Main deck), and upward through the flight deck. Splinters traveled sideward through the splinter shields, and guns numbers 5 and 7'were peppered with small splinters, sorie being embedded in the metal. Splinters went inboard through the starboard bulkhead of number 3 elevator well, across and through the port bulkhead of the elevator well and into D-102-E,- They also scarred and burred the main elevator plungers, the largest scar being approximately 2 inches long, 3/4" wide, and 1/2" deep, The forward bulkhead of the gun gallery was pierced by splinters vvhich passed into D-0203-L, and one splinter went through the forward bulkhead of this space.
                     Thickness of plating penetrated and distances from point of detonation:
     Deck of gun gallery, 1/4" plate, distance 3 to 22 feet.
     Deck of D-103-A, 1/8" plate, distance 10 to 20 feet.
     Deck of D-103-E, (Main Deck), 3/4" plate, distance 19 feet.
     Splinter shields (Group III), 5/8" plate, distance 25 feet.
     Starboard bulkhead of number 3 elevator well, 1/4" plate,
      distance 8 feet.

 

-8-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (2nd hit continued)

              Port bulkhead of number 3 elevator well, 1/4" plate,
  distance 51 feet. Elevator plungers, 1/2" scar, distance 21 to 40 feet.
Forward bulkhead of gun gallery, 3/8" plate, distance
  16 feet.
Forward bulkhead of D-0203-L, 1/4" plnte, distance
  36 feet.

             (d) (1) Flash of bomb plus the subsequent explosion of approximately 40 rounds of 5"/38 caliber powder created a terrific fire on Group III, 5" battery. The rubber matting on the deck burned fiercely, and the paint on the guns was completely burned off. Heavy weather clothing, protective clothing, and gas masks also burned. The ammunition in gun number 5 hoist was not exploded, but the topmost can of powder in number 7 hoist did explode.
                 (2) A fire developed in the Airplane Issue Room D-103-A since the overhead was blastea in. Materials burning were airplane accessories, instruments, flight clothing, rubber lungs, etc., total value about $80,000.
                 (3) The fire in D-103-E was the burning of rubber hose, bedding, electrical leads, and some paint on the overhead.
                 (4) A small fire was started in the port forward corner of the elevator pit and consisted of some small pieces of wood in the lumber stowage.

             (e) All 38 men present on Group III at the time of this bomb hit were killed.

             (f) Damaged machinery was as follows:

                 (1) Number 3 elevator out of commission, the damage sustained from either the first or second hit being enough to put it out. The flight deck safety rail was carried away for about 15 feet; safety rail control shaft on the starboard side was damaged for about 36 feet; forward main elevator platform lock and control gear box on the starboard side was completely destroyed; all electrical leads and trunk housing were carried away; many gouges and burrs were made on the main elevator plungers. The starboard plunger appears, from visual examination, to be slightly bowed.

 

-9-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (2nd hit continued)

             (f) (2) All power wiring, fire control wiring, I.C. wiring, and lighting at Group III was completely destroyed.

                 (3) Motor and solenoid for vent cover on exhaust duct fron steering engine room was demolished.

                 (4) 5" guns numbers 5 and 7 rendered unsafe for use and instruments wrecked; guns and mounts were subjected to intense heat. Hoist for gun number 7 was completely wrecked, and the hoist for gun number 5 damaged and out of commission.

                 (5) The machinery in the aviation sheet netal shop generally damaged.

                 (6) A steering gear casualty developed as follows:
                     (a) The first bonb, as it passed through the gun gallery, tore off the exhaust trunk fron the port forward corner of group III, leaving the vent trunk open at the deck level.
                     (b) Black smoke, followed almost immediately by hot water entered the steering engine room from the cooling air jacket around the starboard steering motor. Black smoke emerged fron the jacket around the port motor. The exhaust vent trunk as installed is continuous from the gun gallery to the tops of the motor casings of the main steering motors.
                     (c) Vent motors and duct covers were immediately secured in that order.
                     (d) Sometime later, when the ventilation systen was reopened to renew the air for steering engine roon personnel, a flood of water and foamite entered the starboard motor vhich was then in use, drowning the motor and also the control panel, and stopping the unit. This was the result of the 2nd bomb hit, as this water and foanite was fron fighting the fire on the gun gallery.
                     (e) personnel, exhausted by heat and smoke, were unable to conplete the operation of shifting to the port unit before passing out. The rudder went all the way hard left, then back to hard right, and then to 20 right rudder where it was jammed and remained until steering control was regained.
                     (f) As soon as the rescue party reached the steering engine room, the port unit was put in operation and steering restored 38 ninutes after it was lost. Temporary ventilation was later provided.

             9.  Very few observations were obtained on smoke from this bomb, but the evidence indicates that the fumes and smoke were not noxious.

 

-10-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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             10.  The fires were fought immediately using fire hoses, foam generators, and C02, and were under control in approximately 40 minutes. However, the fire in D-103-A was persistent and kept recurring at periodic intervals until about 0100, August 25th. As soon as the smoke cleared away and the fire permitted (gun gallery fire), a party of men fron Group IV 5" battery and from topside threw overboard the remaining ready service powder in gun number 7 locker and projectiles frou both numbers 5 and 7 lockers.

             (c) Direct hit by bomb (3rd hit) 1716.

                 1.  Direct hit by bomb, estimated weight 500 pounds; instantaneous fuze; probably low order detonation; diameter impossible to deternine because of large hole resulting fron bomb explosion.

                 2.  Released by dive bomber; estimated altitude of release 1500 feet; angle of dive about 60.

                 3.  Bomb hit flight deck at frame 127, 28 feet to starboard of centerline at starboard corner of number 2 elevator.

                 4.  Bomb exploded instantly as it hit flight deck. There were fragnent scars in the top of the wood planking on the flight deck. Large segments of the nose of this bonb were recovered as far down as the 4th deck, having passed through hatch cover 2-119 and trunk C-408-1A in the elevator pit.

                 5.  Bomb penetrated 1/4" plate and 3" flight deck planking.

                 6.  Bomb exploded instantaneously on impact.

                 7.  Detonation probably was of low order, as many fragments were large (10") and most of the nose was recovered.

                 8.  (a) The impact of bomb produced a hole in the flight deck approximately 10' in diameter.
                     (b) The blast effect helped make the hole in the flight deck, and knocked loose one high pressure torpedo charging flask from its bracket on the hangar deck bulkhead. The flask fell to the hangar deck but sustained no apparent damage. Hydraulic lines to number 2 elevator were ruptured, spreading oil on the hangar deck which made footing very treacherous. Nunber 9 arresting gear purchase cable sheave bracket was danaged. The following cables were cut, all at frame 127 (S); yielding element control cable, purchase cable, and

 

-11-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (3rd hit continued)

barrier cross deck cable. The yielding element was blown overboard.
                     (c) Splinters traveled along the flight deck, scarring the wood planking and penetrating the finger plating and the plates on the flight deck. Splinters also penetrated the after bulkhead of C-0301-M, hatch cover 03-107, elements of number 2 crane, and hit the after end of the island structure. Splinters pierced the overhead of C-0211-A also. Numerous splinters pierced the hangar deck, but only one pierced the 2nd deck. One splinter pierced the port bulkhead of the hangar. The peacoat locker in the starboard side of number 2 elevator pit was pierced by two splinters. This bomb detonated almost against the armor plate protecting the ready torpedo and warhead stowage, but no fragments penetrated the armor.(read that again)
                     Thickness of plating penetrated and distances from point of detonation:
    1.1" Mount number 4 splinter shield, 1/2" plate, distance
        50 feet.
    Number 2 crane - 1", distance 75 feet.
    Number 2 crane boom head - 1/8", distance 113 feet.
    C-0301-M, after bulkhead, 1-1/2" plate, distance 68 feet.
    Finger plating, flight deck, 1/4", distance 10 feet.
    Barrier plate - 1/2", distance 10 feet.
    Knife edge, starboard side flight deck - 3/8", distance
        18 feet.
    C-0211-A overhead, 7/16" plate, distance 12 feet.
    C-109-E, inboard bulkhead, 1/4" plate, distance 12 feet.
    C-0211-A, inboard bulkhead, 1/4" plate; distance 8 feet.
    Hatch 03-107 - 3/16", distance 80 feet.
    Hangar deck, 5/16" plate, distance 27 feet.
    Hangar bulkhead, port side, 1/4" plate, distance 72 feet.
    Longitudinal, hangar overhead - 3/8", distance 8 feet.
    Peacoat locker, 2nd deck, in elevator pit, 1/8" plate.
    distance 33 feet. C-302-1I11, frame 121 (S) overhead, 1/4" plate, distance
        37 feet.
    Number 2 elevator plungers - 3/32", distance 22 to 44 feet.
    Hatch 2-119, 3/16" plate, distance 36 feet.

                     (d) Small fire started in stowage space in port after corner of C-0211-A.

                     (e) Damage to machinery was as follows:

 

-12-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    B.  DIRECT BOMB HIT (3rd hit continued)

             8. (e) (1) Nunber 2 elevator out of commission. Corner shapes of main elevator platform sprung and broken at starboard after corner. Platform lock control shaft, including corner bevel gears, carried away for approximately 15 feet along the starboard after side of the "I" bean forcing the elevator opening in the flight deck. Flight deck safety rail and two safety rail rack stanchions badly damaged. Hydraulic and air lines to main elevator platform lock power unit ruptured and crushed. Elevator control leads and electric leads to after safety rail control motor carried away. The forward main elevator plunger was scored and burred at five points, the largest score being 1-1/2" long by 3/32" deep. The after plunger also was scored.
                  (2) Torpedo elevator out of commission due to wiring being out.

             9.  White snoke was observed; no other observations as to its characteristics.

            10.  The fire in the stowage space of C-0211-A was very small, and was fought with water and C02. It was extinguished in a short time.

         C.  UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS

             (a) Near miss by bomb at approximately 1717.

                 1.  The underwater explosion was ceased by a bomb estimated to weigh 500 to 1000 pounds; released by a dive bonber at an estimated altitude of 1000 feet, and at a low angle of dive, about 50.

                 2.  The near miss bomb exploded on the port side abreast frame 193 about 12 feet from ship's side; depth of explosion unknown. Bomb came in from starboard quarter at about an angle of 160 relative, and struck while the ship was heeled over to starboard in a left turn.

                 3.  There were no outstanding circumstances or peculiarities of the explosion, except that the effect on the overhang of the flight deck was concentrated in a relatively small area which was apparently directly above the inpact point.

                 4.  The bomb produced a single explosion.

 

-13-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    C.  UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS (Continued)

             (a) 5.  The noise was sharp.

             6.  No flash or flaue was noticed.

             7.  No smoke was observed.

             8.  The shock effect was not serious. The stern tube glands for shafts number 2 and nunber 3 leaked excessively. Number 2 propeller had slight curls aft 2" wide and about 3' long on the trailing edges of two of the three blades. Number 3 propeller hnd slight curls aft about 2" wide and 18 to 24" long on the leading edges of all three blades.

             9.  A general flexural vibration of the ship was noted, and was of a low frequency but high amplitude. The after section of the ship was lifted bodily two or three feet.

            10.  There were no liquids in tanks or conpartments near the explosion.

            11.  Ship's hull was not punctured.

            12.  The area of serious indentation of ship's hull was from frames 189 to 196, extending from the first platform deck up to the main deck.

            13.  Damage was as follows:

                 Main Deck

                 Main deck bulged upwards within radius of 5 feet frou intersection of frame 192 and main deck port side. Side plating between the main and 2nd decks between frames 190 and 195 was dished in, the greatest amount being about 6 inches. The degaussing cables were torn away for approximately 30 feet on the port quarter. These were the "Q," and "M" coils.

 

-14-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    C.  UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS (Continued)

             (a)  13. Second Deck

                      D-212-M, frames 192, 192½, 193, and 193½ were bent and distorted. Frames 192½, 193, and 193½ were broken just under main deck. Longitudinals between main and second deck were bowed inward conforming to dishing of side plating. Second deck bulged upward about 2 inches from side plating inboard to distance of 3 feet between frames 192 and 193½. Overhead deck stiffeners warped and distorted at about 3 feet inboard between and including frames 192 and 193½.

                      Third Deck

                      Frames 191, 19l½, 192, 192½, 193, and 193½ were dished in, bent, and wrinkled. Frame 193 was broken at weld about 5 feet above the deck. Longitudinals between frames 191 and 194 were wrinkled and distorted to conform to the dishing of the side plating. The deck in C.P.O. washroom, D-306-L, was wrinkled to inboard boundaries of the washroom from the side plating with considerable distortion in the form of a wrinkle 5 feet inboard and parallel to the side plating intersection. Side plating was dished in between 2nd and 3rd decks between frames 191 and 194 to a depth of 3 inches. Deck longitudinal beneath 2nd deck about 7 feet inboard was wrinkled between frames 191 and 192.

                      Fourth Deck (D-423-A)

                      Bulkheads 190½ and 192 were wrinkled 5 feet inboard from the side plating. Frames 189, 189½, 190, 191, and 191½ were completely warped out of shape and have 4 bends and wrinkles. Longitudinals between 3rd and 4th decks and between frames 188½ and 193 were bowed inward. Deck was wrinkled to a distance of about 10 feet from the side plating. Side plating was dished inward from frames 188½ to 193. There is no doubt but that considerable wrinkling has occurred in the void spaces below vhich are D-424A-V and D-530-V.

             14.  There was no penetration of the hull by fragments. However, considerable damage occurred to the structure above the main deck due to the geyser of water thrown up.

 

-15-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    C.  UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS (Continued)

             (a) 14.  Flight deck

                      Planking between frames 195 and 197 to a distance of about 8 feet inboard from the port waterway was split and shattered. Flight deck between francs 194½ and 198 fron port waterway inboard 17 feet was bulged up about 8 inches. Four deck longitudinals under flight deck were damaged between frames 184½ and 198. Numbering them from the gallery walkway inboard, they were damaged as follows:

Deck longitudinal nunber 1 bowed upward 12 inches.
Deck longitudinal nunber 2 bowed upward 26 inches,
 shattered with a 12 inch break at frame 184½
Deck longitudinal nunber 3 wrinkled and bowed upward
 about 8 inches, with a break at weld, frame 184½.
Deck longitudinal nunber 4 boved upward about 4 inches.
The 4 inch scupper drain line under flight deck overhang
 was completely shattered for a distance of 40 feet.
A 60 man life raft secured under ranp port side was conpletely
 demolished.

             15.  W.T. doors, hatches, scuttles, etc., in the vicinity of the damage were all closed.

             16, 17, and 18.  There was no flooding.

             19.  No fires were started.

             20.  No damage control measures were necessary, other than the sounding of all voids and tanks in the vicinity. They were all dry.

             (b) Other Near Misses

             1.   There were three other confirmed near misses by bombs released from dive bonbers. The types, weights, and diameters are unknown. It is believed, however, that they were of two types because there were two kinds of explosions. One type caused a dull sound, while the other caused a ripping, tearing sound. Near misses referred to here are those close enough to the ship's side to cause a geyser of water to fall on the flight deck, minor damage to the ship's side, and in sone cases deposits of powder residue on the ship's side at the waterline.

 

-16-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    C.  UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS (Continued)

             (b) 2.  The three near misses referred to in the previous paragraph hit abreast frames 70 (P), 100 (P), and 80 (S), and caused the damage indicated in paragraph 3 below. There were other near misses which caused geysers of water to fall on deck but which caused no apparent damage to the ship. Near misses were reported (but not confirned) abreast the ship at the following locations: Off Group II, 5" Battery; off frame 50 (P); off frame 120 (P); off Group IV, 5" Battery; off frame 50(S); off Mount IV, l.l" Battery; and off frame 125 (S). It is estimated that at least 30 Japanese planes dived on the ENTERPRISE.

                 3.  Damage resulting fron near misses was as follows:

                     (a) Shrapnel hits and punctures along port side and upper decks from frames 78 to 93.

                     (b) Auxiliary radio antenna carried away at frame 80 (P).

                     (c) Sections of gasoline line from frames 80 to 106 (P) at hangar deck and flight deck levels holed.

                     (d) I.C. and lighting circuits cut in nunerous places between frames 75 and 85 (P).

                     (e) "M" and "F" degaussing coils had numerous shrapnel punctures at frame 80, both port and starboard side.

         E.  DISCUSSION

             1.  That the ENTERPRISE was able to absorb and control the damage and fires resulting from three hits and three near misses is considered to be due primarily to damage control preparedness measures and the splendid efforts of the ship's company, particularly the Damage Control Personnel, in fighting fires.

             2.  A vigorous campaign to increase the resistance of the ship to damage was started after the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor and was further intensified after Midway. The damage reports of the LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN and the report and recommendations of the Damage Control Board of Inspection headed by Commander Watt were carefully studied and lessons applied. In addition, the tremendous job of scraping paint fron inside bulkheads and overheads throughout the ship had been pursued on a systematic basis and had progressed to the point that an estimated 25 tons of paint had been removed. Practically all paint had been removed from the second and third deck areas wrecked and burned by bomb hit number 1, which probably accounts for the fact that the fire did not spread to adjoining compartments.

 

-17-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    E.  DISCUSSION (Continued)

             3.  It had been made standard practice to keep the gasoline tanks of planes on the hangar deck drained whenever this could be done without causing delays in launching operations. Furthermore, it was standard practice to drain all lines of the gasoline system down to the gasoline tanks whenever the system was not in use, and to fill all lines with C02 under pressure whenever it appeared that an attack by enemy planes was imminent. The C02 in the lines served the dual purpose of displacing all explosive fumes and acting as an indicator of any breaks in the lines. Gasoline tank compartments are kept constantly filled with C02 around the tanks.

             4.  Repair party personnel at each station were dispersed in the adjacent areas to reduce the possibility of a casualty to an entire repair party. Medical personnel had been similarly dispersed at battle dressing stations established at widely separated locations about the ship. Damage control material and medical supplies were dispersed, and an emergency supply of dry provisions was stored in the forward part of the ship, the principal provision store rooms being grouped aft.

             5.  Men had been detailed to operate the permanently installed C02 systens in the paint locker and storeroons, alcohol locker, and pyrotechnic lockers in case of a fire aft. Great stress had been laid on the wearing of steel helmets and flash proof clothing by all hands, and men had been indoctrinated to lie prone on deck, head inboard, protecting the head with arms and hands during an actual attack, provided battle duties permitted. It was apparent from reports and evidence after the attack that these instructions saved many lives and reduced the severity of many burns and shrapnel wounds.

             6.  During the current mission, formal damage control problens had been held every week or ten days as practicable, followed by couplete analyses of the actions taken and omissions made by the damage control party personnel participating in these drills.

             7.  Although there were a total of 74 killed and 95 wounded during the action, the Medical Department proved to be entirely self-sufficient and handled the situation without calling for aid from the remainder of the ship's company. No attempt was made to move wounded personnel from battle dressing stations to the sick bay until fires in the vicinity of the sick bay had been extinguished, the area cleared of smoke, and condition "Baker" set. The excellent

 

-18-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    E.  DISCUSSION (Continued)

treatment given to the injured and wounded is attested by the fact that with the exception of four men who died fron multiple extreme injuries the morning following the engagement, there have been no subsequent fatalities amoung the casualties.

             8.  In general, it is felt that the ship's company were as well prepared as practicable in a carrier to combat all types of damage which might be expected in an attack by enemy aircraft, submarines, or surface vessels. The fact that the ship was steaming at 24 knots (later at 29 knots) and landing aircraft less than one hour after the start of the attack is considered to be ample substantiation of this contention.

         F. RECOMMENDATIONS

            1.  During the course of the damage control following the attack, a number of deficiencies in the ship's installations and damage control equipment were noted, as well as the need for additional instruction of personnel in certain phases of damage control. Intimate knowledge of the conpartmentation and accesses of the ship by all damage control personnel was the most obvious requisite to effective fire fighting. The next most important requirement apparent was a first hand knowledge by all Damage Control officers and enlisted personnel of the latest approved methods of fire fighting and use of the various equipment available. As had been foreseen, smoke offered the greatest difficulty which the fire fighting parties had to overcome, and this condition was aggravated by the fact that much of the fire fighting had to be carried on after dark.

            2.  The following are recommendations concerning material:

                (a) A type of flashlight more powerful than the flash lights or electric lanterns now furnished must be provided for the use of damage control parties. It is recommended that approximately 100 of the large focusing flashlights be furnished each carrier. It was found that this type of flashlight will penetrate through snoke to distances several times greater than those penetrated by the standard issue flashlights.

 

-19-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    F.  RECOMMENDATIONS

             2.  (b) Need was strongly felt for small, garden type, hose which a single man could drag into a compartment for extinguishing small smoldering fires in bedding, clothing, combustible stores, etc. A 2½" hose cannot be effectively handled for this purpose, and in any event requires several men to handle the nozzle. It is recommended that each carrier be furnished with approximately twelve 50 ft. lengths of garden type hose equipped with quick couplings, together with three manifolds, each having an alternate 2½" or l½" supply connection and five discharge connections to accomodate five of the small garden type hoses. The possibility of using air hose interchangeably for this purpose is suggested. Adjustable spray nozzles should be furnished for the garden hose.

                 (c) Two large portable air driven blowers with adequate lengths of air ducts should be furnished to each carrier in addition to the small blowers now supplied. The air ducts should be furnished in approximately 25 foot lengths, each length sufficiently reinforced to prevent collapse, and equipped with quick couplings.

                 (d) The new type "A" rescue breathing apparatus sets have proven to be unsatisfactory. Personnel are unanimous in preferring the old type to the new type "A" in its present design. In the type "A" apparatus, the lung is easily deflated by rapid breathing or by pressure caused by normal movement of the wearer's arms in fighting a fire, squeezing through scuttles, or crawling through or over debris in a damage area. Deflation of the lung necessitates leaving the smoke filled area in order to refill the lung with fresh air. The furnishing of an apparatus of improved design is a most urgent necessity. The present allowance of rescue breathing sets should be doubled.

                 (e) The present type of fire hose nozzle should be replaced as soon as practicable with a nozzle incorporating a regulating valve, similar to the nozzles used by civilian fire departments. Such a nozzle would materially aid in fighting fires in restricted areas.

 

-20-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    F.  RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

             2.  (f) The two portable foam generators recently rigged by the ship's force were located at Repair II and III, and proved to be of much value. It is recommended that one portable foam generator be furnished for each of four repair stations on the 3rd deck.

                 (g) It is essential that the rubber matting on the 5" gun galleries and the walks around the navigating and flag bridge be replaced as soon as possible by a suitable and non-inflatable substitute, as this material burned with a stubborn flame on Number III gun gallery. In the interest of reasonable comfort for the personnel, it is considered that the substitute should be such as to avoid the necessity of standing in water during wet weather. Sand paint, which has been tried, does not appear to be a satisfactory solution due principally to poor wearing qualities. The use of Ferrox Deck Covering might provide a solution. An asbestos matting of an appreciable thickness would be better.

                 (h) The furnishing of new and approved, light weight flash proof, clothing should be expedited as much as possible. The present clothing, while it proved to be of definite effectiveness, is too bulky and warm to wear for long periods in tropical climates.

                 (i) It is understood that there are available on the commercial market felt soled shoes which provide a firm footing even on surfaces slushed with a mixture of oil and water. If this is the case, it is strongly recommended that such shoes be issued to all danage control personnel to be worn during an engagement.

                 (j) Unless the new folding belt type life preservers are to be furnished in the near future and in sufricient quantities to equip all hands, it is recommended that the life jacket stowage of the ENTERPRISE, and other carriers as applicable, be revised to concentrate the stowage on or above the flight deck, on the forecastle, and on the fantail. It is considered that the present life jacket stowage, with the major portion of the life jackets stowed around the hangar decic, is too likely to be rendered inaccessible by the existence of a large fire in the hangar. At the same time, it is not considered practicable or advisable to attempt to keep the present type of life jacket at battle stations or to require all hands to wear them during General Quarters.

 

-21-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    F.  RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

             2.  (k) The jamming of the rudder at 20 right due to the shorting of the starboard steering unit motor as the result of water entering through the ventilation duct was the most embarrassing casualty suffered by the ship. It is recommended that the ducts supplying cooling and ventilating air to the steering units and the steering engineroom be redesigned in order to eliminate the possibility of the shorting of a motor by casual water entering through the ventilation ducts and an air conditioning and cooling unit installed. A temporary rearrangement has already been effected in this ship. It is further recommended that a means be provided of disconnecting the rudder fron the steering engine gears in case of a rudder jam so that, when disconnected, the rudder will bt free to trail amidships, permitting the ship to be steered by the main engines. This matter is now under study.

                 (1) The permanently installed C02 systems for the paint locker, paint storerooms, and pyrotechnic lockers should be modified as necessary in order to use a standard 50 pound C02 flask instead of the non-standard 50 pound flasks (contractor's priority item) now incorporated. This is highly advisable in order that the C02 supply can be replaced from the ship's stock after an engagement in which it was deemed necessary to operate these systems. The necessity of carrying a number of heavy spare flasks of a special type can thus be obviated.

                 (m) Firemain pressure gauges should be installed on the port forward and starboard after sections of the system. Such gauges are already installed on the starboard forward and port after sections.

                 (n) It is considered that the present firemain is not large enough to supply sufficient amount of water to serve the large number of plugs which might be required in order to fight several fires in the same general area of the ship simultaneously. It is recommended that a larger firemain be considered for future carrier construction.

 

-22-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    F.  RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

             2.  (o) The ship's service air line connections on the 3rd deck have reduction valves which reduce the pressure to 50 pounds per square inch. It is recommended that additional connections be installed to provide line pressures of 100 pounds per square inch for use in driving portable air driven blowers and portable air driven submersible pumps.

                 (p) Each topside fire plug should have a second outlet for the attachment of a 1½" fire hose in addition to the standard 2½" hose connection. Such an alternate connection would eliminate the necessity of disconnecting the 2½" fire hose, normally kept connected to each plug, screwing on an adapter, and connecting a l½" hose when it is desired to use the spray nozzle.

                 (q) It is recommended that the practicability be investigated of designing a spray nozzle to which a fog nozzle could be readily attached by means of a quick acting coupling.

                 (r) The kerosene tank on the fantail is permanently installed, and is drained through compartments below. It is recommended that the present tank be replaced by one which may be dropped overboard in an emergency by a quick release mechanism.

             3.  3.  The following recommendations apply to personnel:

                 (a) As many officers and men as practicable, including all damage control personnel, should be afforded the opportunity of attending a well organized and equipped fire fighting school. The school should be so organized as to provide an opportunity for each student actually to use all modern fire fighting equipment in fighting fires, rather than simply to attend lectures on the subject.

                 (b) A very large number of men must be trained and drilled in the use of rescue breathing apparatus. It is of particular importance that the storekeepers of all storerooms throughout the ship be so trained, as storeroom keepers are the only men who are likely to be sufficiently well acquainted with the layout of storerooms to find their way through smoke to get to a fire. Storekeepers should also attend the fire fighting school.

 

-23-

 


CV6/Lll-l(50-Wy)
  (0200)
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)  
September 5, 1942
CONFIDENTIAL:

Subject:     War Damage Report.

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   2.    F.  RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

             3.  (c) Chains rather than fabric cords should be provided with identification tags. In many cases identification tags were separated from unrecognizable bodies due to the tag cord being severed by burning.

                 (d) The utility of the ordinary gas mask for use in a smoke filled compartment for a limited time should be stressed to all hands. In several cases, men who were temporarily entrapped in wrecked compartments had the presence of mind to don gas masks and were thereby able to sustain themselves long enough to grope their way out of the debris and smoked filled compartments to safety.

 

 

 

A.C. DAVIS

Copy to (via CinCPac for release)      Cominch
     CinCPac
     ComAirPac
     ComTasFor 16 (direct)
     

 

 

 

-24-

 


SOURCE:
National Archives & Records Administration, San Francisco Branch
Record Group 181, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard General Correspondence 1941-45

Transcribed by RESEARCHER @ LARGE. Formatting & Comments Copyright R@L.

Section Home | Researcher@Large Home

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